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The Other of Jacques Lacan 
 
John Shannon Hendrix 
 
 
Language in the symbolic of Lacan is defined by the Other, which is the “in-
tersubjectivity of the ‘we’ that it assumes,”1 as described in Écrits. The sub-
ject enters language in relationship to the other in perception, the perceived 
object or person, as recognized by the other. As described by Lacan, “What 
constitutes me as subject is my question. In order to be recognized by the 
other, I utter what was only in view of what will be [the future anterior of 
what I shall have been for what I am in the process of becoming].” The sub-
ject is only present in language in anticipation of a response from the other. 
“In order to find him, I call him by a name that he must assume or refuse in 
order to reply to me. I identify myself in language, but only by losing myself 
in it like an object.” In the same way, the subject identifies itself in history, 
in response to the anticipation of the Other, and loses itself in it like an ob-
ject. In history, Hegel argued in Reason in History, the individual subject 
must sacrifice itself to the universal; it must sacrifice its Moralität, intrinsic 
morality (the concept derived from the anticipation of the other), to its Sit-
tlichkeit, extrinsic morality (the rules of the anticipation of the other). Moral-
ität is the retention of the presence of the unconscious in reason, the being-
in-itself of subjective spirit. Sittlichkeit is the being-for-self of objective spir-
it, the doubling of reason in language and perception; it is the definition of 
the subject as constituted by the Other and by history. The subject overcomes 
its absence, its non-being in history, as in language, by converting itself into 
an object at the disposal of the other, as an agent of language, and as an ob-
ject at the disposal of the Other, as an agent of history. 
      The Hegelian Moralität corresponds to the ideal ego of Lacan in the im-
aginary, the subject as seen by itself as prior to the Other, though mediated 
by the other, while the Sittlichkeit corresponds to the symbolic order, the “I” 
(je) of the subject’s discourse, the subject as seen by itself as it is inserted in-
to language. The distinction between the symbolic, the I (je), and the Imagi-
nary ego, the me (moi), is the distinction between unconscious and 
conscious, interpersonal relations in the Other and natural relations in the 
imaginary, as derived from Freud, who wrote “Das Ich und das Es in order 
to maintain this fundamental distinction between the true subject of the un-
conscious and the ego as constituted in its nucleus by a series of alienating 
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identifications” (Écrits, A Selection, p. 128), according to Lacan. The cycle 
of alienating identifications which constitutes the ego in language is impos-
sible to break, as the unconscious is inaccessible. The principle of objectifi-
cation which determines the unbreakable cycle is the principle of 
méconnaissance, misrecognition. When the subject speaks, it is always of 
something which is other to the subject and which is inaccessible to the sub-
ject in any form of consciousness or self-consciousness, that it, the uncon-
scious, thus the subject is lost to itself in discursive reason, language and 
perception, unable to know itself or understand itself beyond the boundaries 
of discursive reason, nous pathetikos.  
      The identity of the subject cannot be found within the “infinity of reflec-
tion that the mirage of consciousness consists of” (p. 134). Imaginary ego 
identity in discursive reason is an indefinite play of reflections between mir-
rors in which the speaking subject is trapped, as it was for Plotinus, without 
access to the “supposed progress of interiority” in which the subject sees it-
self constituted in méconnaissance. The self-alienation of reason in objective 
spirit precludes access to the subjective spirit of the subject prior to discur-
sive reason. The subject becomes that which was defined by Georges Ba-
taille in “The Pineal Eye” as enclosed in the “degrading chains of logic,”2 or 
in “closed systems assigned to life by reasonable conceptions,”3 as described 
in “The Notion of Expenditure.” For Bataille, the subject is defined in the 
struggle with the imaginary, the inescapable structure of human thought in 
language and perception. In such a struggle, “being is ‘ungraspable’—it is 
only grasped in error,”4 as in méconnaissance. The subject is defined by the 
mirror reflections in which it is trapped, which define to it the relationship 
between the self and the other as one of simulacrum, the reflection of a re-
flection with nothing being reflected, which is the chôra in language as trace 
or point de capiton, the point of escape from the play of mirror reflections, of 
both the perceived world and the inaccessible unconscious, which is a myth. 
      The subject is as the subject in the allegory of the cave in Plato’s Repub-
lic, if the cave is taken as representative of the self. The subject is a prisoner 
in the self as given by language, as the prisoners in the cave in the Republic 
are unable to see “anything of themselves or their fellows except the shad-
ows thrown by the fire on the wall of the cave opposite them” (515).5 The 
cave represents the boundaries of the self as conscious reason and percep-
tion. The shadows on the wall of the cave are the others, the objects of per-
ception in the imaginary order, and the fire outside the cave is the 
unconscious. The fire is separated from the cave by a curtain wall built along 
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a road, which is “like a screen at puppet shows between the operator and 
their audience” (514). The curtain wall is the wall of language, through 
which the unconscious and the objects of perception are filtered. “The realm 
revealed by sight,” perception in language, “corresponds to the prison” (517), 
or the cave, in which the subject is caught, in the play of reflections, “and the 
light of the fire in the prison to the power of the sun,”  which is the good, or 
the One, active or cosmic intellect, or the unconscious. For Plato, “the ascent 
into the upper world and the sight of the objects there,” on the other side of 
the curtain wall, that is, on the other side of language, is “the upward pro-
gress of the mind into the intelligible region,” an understanding of the self 
outside of perception and language, in the unconscious. In psychoanalysis, 
the progress of the mind into the unconscious is seen as more of a descent 
than an assent, as the mind isn’t going anywhere outside of itself. 
      In the constitution of the imaginary ego, the symbolic order dissipates, 
and the imaginary shields the subject from the absence. It is hard to know the 
reality of the self as anything other than the shadows on the wall. The objects 
of the imaginary are the objects structured by perception, as in the shadows 
on the wall of the cave. For Bataille the imaginary entails a homogeneous 
representation of perceived reality wherein existence is a “neatly defined 
itinerary from one practical sign to another” (Visions of Excess, p. 82), and 
“acts undertaken with some rational end are only servile responses to a ne-
cessity” (p. 231), in the absence of the unconscious in conscious thought. La-
can explains, “it is thus that the functions of mastery which we incorrectly 
call the synthesizing functions of the ego, establish on the basis of a libidinal 
alienation,” the alienation of the imaginary ego, “the development that fol-
lows from it, namely, what I once called the paranoiac principle of human 
knowledge, according to which its objects are subjected to a law of imagi-
nary reduplication, evoking the homologation of an endless series of nota-
ries…” (Écrits, A Selection, p. 138), in the prison of conscious thought.  
      The imaginary ego is predicated on a relation to the other which is mutu-
ally self-sustaining and mutually exclusive of symbolic identification, alt-
hough it is dictated by symbolic identification in the Other. The imaginary 
self is thus delimited in the necessity of the other, and the necessity of the 
Other, as a homogeneous and functionary self, in the relation between the 
notary of the profession to the other notary, and the notary to the client. “But 
for me,” wrote Lacan, “the decisive signification of the alienation that consti-
tutes the Urbild of the ego appears in the relation of exclusion that then 
structures the dual relation of ego to ego.” The imaginary ego is reaffirmed 
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by the other, in its functionalism, and can never be predicated on anything 
other than a relation to the other, the other notary in the profession, as in the 
objective spirit of Hegel, which establishes the self as other, as that which is 
not the other, in an irresoluble dialectic, which mirrors the structure of reason 
in which the imaginary is established in language and perception. 
      It was Bataille’s desire to escape the cycle of functionalism created by 
the imaginary ego, to search for something in life which is other to it. As he 
wrote in Eroticism, Death and Sensuality, “there is in nature and there sub-
sists in man a movement which always exceeds the bounds, that can never be 
anything but partially reduced to order. We are generally unable to grasp it. 
Indeed it is by definition that which can never be grasped, but we are con-
scious of being in its power: the universe that bears us along answers no pur-
pose that reason defines.”6 For Lacan the movement is the movement of the 
unconscious, which exceeds the bounds of conscious reason, which is unable 
to be grasped, that is exterior to the universe of the imaginary, the universe 
of language, a universe which cannot answer to its own premise, because it is 
only a partial reality.  
      For Bataille, in “The Notion of Expenditure,” “human life cannot in any 
way be limited to the closed systems assigned to it by reasonable concep-
tions. The immense travail of recklessness, discharge, and upheaval that con-
stitutes life could be expressed by stating that life starts only with the deficit 
of these systems” (Visions of Excess, p. 128). Human life cannot be limited 
by conscious reason; the discharge and upheaval within the systems of rea-
son are the manifestations of the unconscious in conscious thought, made 
present in the deficit and limitations of the systems of reason in language and 
perception, in the absences, gaps, scotomata, and méconnaissance that reveal 
the limitations of reason. In “The Sorcerer’s Apprentice,” Bataille endorsed 
“acts undertaken in pursuit of seductive images of chance,” which are “the 
only ones that respond to the need to live like a flame” (p. 231). The seduc-
tive images of chance are the traces or hints of the unconscious, that which 
exceeds reason in conscious thought. Bataille sought, as described in “The 
Pineal Eye,” a transgression of the “degrading chains of logic” (p. 80) of 
conscious thought which constitute the imaginary ego; he sought “a new lac-
eration within a lacerated nature,” access to the symbolic order of language 
in the unconscious.  
      For Lacan, the self-identification of the subject, and perhaps a transgres-
sion of the imaginary order, begins when the subject “recognizes and there-
fore distinguishes his action in each of these two registers,” the imaginary 
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and symbolic, “if he is to know why he intervenes, at what moment the op-
portunity presents itself and how to seize it” (Écrits, A Selection, p. 140). 
This is accomplished in the understanding of the relation between the subject 
and the other in perception in the imaginary, in distinction from the relation 
between the subject and the Other, that is, language, in the symbolic. “The 
prime condition for this is that he should be thoroughly imbued with the rad-
ical difference between the Other to which his speech must be addressed, and 
that second other who is the individual that he sees before him, and from 
whom and by means of whom the first speaks to him in the discourse that he 
holds before him.” Such recognition would enable the subject to accomplish 
the “annulling of his own resistance when he is the other with a small o,” and 
then “he will be able to be he to whom this discourse is addressed.”  
      This is not an easy task, because, as has been seen, the relation of the 
subject to the other is determined by the relation of the subject to the Other, 
and the imaginary identification that the subject might have with the other is 
subsumed by the symbolic identification with the Other, without the aware-
ness of the subject, in unconscious functionings, which has objectified the 
imaginary identification into a dialectical product of reason. Thus “the imag-
inary shaping of the subject by desires more or less fixed or regressed in their 
relation to the object is too inadequate and partial to provide the key to it” (p. 
141). As Freud established the extent to which linguistic discourse deter-
mines unconscious activity, the structure of the Other has already played a 
role in the constitution of the Imaginary ego, as seen in the original conflict 
of the mirror stage, between gestalt object identification and the fragmentary 
nature of experience and the world as it is perceived.  
      The Other is “the locus in which is constituted the I who speaks to him 
who hears, that which is said by the one being already the reply,” the func-
tion of the subject in language as always already objectified in the anticipa-
tion of signification, but the Other extends into the subject beyond language 
itself, in the constitution of the subject as it enters into language. Imaginary 
desire or ego is embedded in “a signifier that has been taken possession of by 
repression,” as manifest in the desire for recognition. The relation between 
the subject and the other is dictated by the relation between the subject and 
the Other in so far as the linguistic mechanisms of repression, displacement 
and distortion, are operative both in the unconscious and in conscious dis-
course. The unconscious appears in conscious discourse through the primary 
repression of language, which is also a mechanism of unconscious activity, 
as shown in the analysis of dreams. As the unconscious is the discourse of 
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the Other, the relation between the subject and the other, on both the symbol-
ic and imaginary level, is a relation determined by the Other, despite what 
might be given by the mirage of consciousness in perception and the mécon-
naissance of conscious thought. Access to the Other would be useless with-
out an understanding of how the other is constituted by the Other, and how 
the perceived object in the imaginary is transformed in the mirror stage, sub-
ject to the laws of discursive reason. 
      The ego which is formed during the mirror stage and the acquisition of 
language is based on an object identification which is interceded by a rela-
tion to the self as object, a relation which is formed during the mirror stage 
and which is in conflict with the fragmentary experiences of phenomenologi-
cal perception, and which is influenced by the symbolic in the entrance of the 
subject into language. The ideal ego is the imaginary ego, and it serves as a 
link between the objects of perception, and spoken words in language, and 
the symbolic order, and the ego ideal of the symbolic order. The retention of 
the gestalt ideal ego in the subject in the imaginary is a form of resistance to 
the symbolic ego ideal, the unconscious constitution of the subject, and the 
resistance is sustained by the subject’s relation to the other, which makes the 
differentiation between the relation of the subject to the other and the Other 
more difficult.  
      As a function of the imaginary, the ideal ego is both a permanence and 
totality, and a fragmentation and ambiguity, in the self-identity of the sub-
ject. The ideal ego is as reinforced by the gaze or regard of the other in per-
ception as it is by enunciation of the subject by the other, in the anticipation 
of presence. The self-perception of the subject as image in relation to the 
other is thus as illusory as the self-perception of the subject as name in rela-
tion to the other. The subject is objectified and elided in anticipation of the 
gaze in the same way that the subject is elided in the signifying chain of lan-
guage. Both the gaze and the spoken word, object identification and auditory 
perception, as mnemic residues, are present in the imaginary ego, as frag-
mentary objects. They are subject to linguistic mishaps—ellipsis, pleonasm, 
syllepsis apposition, catachresis, autonomasis—which reveal the uncon-
scious, and which threaten the mirage of the totality of the ideal ego. The ba-
sis of the imaginary ego is the méconnaissance which leads it to mistake 
itself for a totality in relation to the fragmentary psyche of the subject. The 
subject “who thinks he can accede to himself by designating himself in the 
statement, is no more than such an object” (Écrits, A Selection, p. 315), 
fragmentary and nonrepresentational. The repression of the subject is thus 
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given by both its definition in the Other and the false identity fixations of the 
ideal ego. The ideal ego is both a constituent of the Other, as the mirror stage 
is coincident with the development of language, and in rivalry with the Oth-
er, as an imaginary construct. The ideal ego is nevertheless subject to the re-
lation to the other, in the anticipation of recognition and signification, thus 
the problematic situation of the subject in the desire to access the Other. 
      Spoken language in discursive reason is the source of méconnaissance, 
subject to the community of symbols into which the subject is inserted, 
which is the Other. In its participation in the Other, the ego misrecognizes its 
own unconscious, but the unconscious contributes to the constitution of the 
ego, the imaginary function. The subject is excentric to its unconscious, to its 
own mechanisms of thinking, and does not know what it is. It is impossible 
for the subject to know itself, given the dichotomy of the imaginary and 
symbolic, and the constitution of the subject by forces inaccessible to it. The 
knowledge on the part of the subject of its unconscious is replaced by the il-
lusions of consciousness, the mirage of the cogito, the thinking subject. The 
subject decenters itself in its commitment to language; science and technolo-
gy in discursive reason are manifestations of the mechanisms of language, 
symbolic structures, into which the subject inserts itself, and through which 
the subject loses itself. Language itself is as a machine in that it detaches it-
self from the subject, as the Other, and objectifies the subject in its detach-
ment. In language, in its objectification, the subject is fragmented and 
disconnected, but the ego of the subject retains the virtual and alienated unity 
given by the gestalt image of the ideal ego from the mirror stage. The subject 
is divided in language, and further divided by the relation between language 
and the perceived object, between the Other and the other. 
      The ego is in the beginning an imaginary function, but is then objectified 
as a symbolic function in the entrance of the subject into language. The im-
aginary ego reinforces itself in the image of the other, while the ego ideal of 
the symbolic reinforces itself in the fragmentary and dispersed structure of 
language. The subject in language is a “body in pieces,” as described by La-
can in Seminar II (The Ego in Freud’s Theory and in the Technique of Psy-
choanalysis),7 as a product of the linguistic structure of perception, and the 
linguistic structure of the unconscious. The dream contains the dialectic of 
the imaginary and symbolic, image and word. The body of the other appears 
in the dream to reinforce the unified body image of the ideal ego of the sub-
ject, but the unified body is inserted into a fragmented structure which re-
flects the structure of language, the structure of the Other. The dream is an 
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“imaginary iridescence” (p. 57) of shifting changes, interplays of forms, va-
rieties of viewpoints, condensations and displacements, which fragments the 
unified possibility of experience as language fragments the body (the ideal 
ego) of the subject. 
      The unconscious is “always manifested as that which vacillates in a split 
in the subject,” between the imaginary and the symbolic, as Lacan described 
in Seminar XI (The Four Fundamental Concepts of Psycho-Analysis).8 If the 
unconscious is structured like a language, then its structuring is one of dis-
continuity, impediment, vacillation, a “strange temporality” (p. 25). The vac-
illation in the split of the subject is manifest in metaphor and metonymy in 
language, in the relation between the signifier and the signified, the subject 
and the other. The unconscious is seen as a primordial “cut” in thought. The 
function of the unconscious is “in profound, initial, inaugural, relation with 
the function of the concept of the Unbegriff—or Begriff [idea] of the original 
Un, namely, the cut” (p. 43), which is the archê of the bar between the signi-
fier and the signified, and the point de capiton in language. The function of 
the subject is predicated on the cut, the split, which manifests itself in a tem-
poral “pulsation” in language, as the subject is elided and then re-emerges 
from underneath the bar between the signifier and the signified. Language 
can only establish the possibility of the presence of the subject temporarily, 
and thus the temporality of the unconscious is a pulsative one, in the coming 
and going of the illusion of consciousness. 
      The dialectic of the ego and the Other, the circuit in which the subject 
becomes a link, is the dialectic of the ego and the unconscious. The subject 
can only experience itself in the Other, in the unconscious, as in pieces, de-
composed. The perception-consciousness system is itself fragmented, and 
unknowable in its entirety to the subject which is divided in the symbolic. As 
the subject reaffirms its ideal ego in the other, in the imaginary function of 
the ego, it has consciousness, but the consciousness is only a reflection, the 
product of the play of reflections given by perception, as in the allegory of 
the cave of Plato. The consciousness of the subject is only the consciousness 
of the other. Consciousness becomes self-consciousness as it becomes objec-
tified in the Other, as objective spirit becomes subjective spirit for Hegel, but 
as such consciousness only sees itself as the consciousness of the other. Con-
sciousness cannot see itself; the subject cannot identify itself in language, the 
Other, the unconscious—it is only present to itself as an absence. “This is 
what gives you the illusion that consciousness is transparent to itself [the co-
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gito],” Lacan wrote in Seminar II. “We aren’t present, in the reflection; to 
see the reflection, we are in the consciousness of the other” (p. 112).  
      This is illustrated in the painting Las Meninas by Diego Velazquez from 
the seventeenth century. The viewer of the painting is in the place of the sub-
ject of the painting, which is the king and queen of Spain, whose portrait is 
being painted by the painter, off to the left. The painting presents the process 
of the royal portrait being painted from the point of view of the sitters. A re-
flection of the king and queen is visible in a mirror on a wall in the back-
ground. When the viewer of the painting, the subject, enters the painting, it 
takes the place of the sitters, the other, but the reflection of the subject is not 
visible in the mirror. To see the reflection, the subject must assume the con-
sciousness of the sitters, the other, whose reflection is in the mirror. The sub-
ject, the viewer, is only present as an absence, and the consciousness of the 
subject, the cogito, is only given by the consciousness of the other. 
      The subject must constitute its ideal ego, its imaginary self, in the Other, 
which would be the perspective construction of the painting. The subject 
cannot see itself from the ideal ego of the imaginary body image of itself, the 
reflection of the other, because it is separated by the wall of language, be-
cause “it is in the space of the Other that he sees himself and the point from 
which he looks at himself is also in that space” (The Four Fundamental Con-
cepts of Psycho-Analysis, p. 144), as described by Lacan, the mirror in the 
painting, the vanishing point in perspective construction. The place of the 
Other from which the subject sees itself is also the point from which the sub-
ject speaks in language, and it is the place of the unconscious, which deter-
mines the subject in language and perception as a construct of the Other, but 
the subject as construct of the Other does not have access to its source, as 
conscious thought does not have access to conscious thought. The dream, as 
the road to the unconscious, takes the subject along in its search for its place 
in the Other. In every place that the subject looks, it perceives the image of 
its body as the ideal ego formed in the mirror stage.  
      Because the image of the unified body can only be perceived in the other, 
it is only perceived from the outside, from the ex-centric subject. Lacan ex-
plained in Seminar II, “Because of this double relation which he has with 
himself, all the objects of his world are always structured around the wander-
ing shadow of his own ego” (p. 166). The ideal unity of the subject which is 
unattainable is evoked at every moment of perception. The object identifica-
tion that the subject experiences, and the identification with the other, can 
never satisfy the subject faced with its own absence and dehiscence in such 
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an ego identification. The subject is irreducibly separated from the objects of 
perception, from the world which it perceives, because it cannot find itself 
there, though its dehiscence is contained in the object. The imaginary is al-
ways mediated by the symbolic, and “it is in the nature of desire to be radi-
cally torn.” The momentary, ephemeral experiences of perception alienate 
the subject from itself; the shadows on the wall of the cave reinforce the sub-
ject as prisoner in the cave, prisoner of itself. 
      The object can only be perceived in unity with the subject from without, 
temporarily, and this alienation causes disarray and fragmentation in the sub-
ject. Perception can only be sustained “within a zone of nomination” (p. 
169), according to Lacan. The name has no relationship to the “spatial dis-
tinctiveness of the object,” the imaginary object identification, but rather to 
its temporal dimension in perception. The object, while it is “at one instant 
constituted as a semblance of the human subject, a double of himself” in a 
reflection, it “nonetheless has a certain permanence of appearance over 
time,” as given by the insertion of the object in perception, and the insertion 
of the subject in the symbolic. Perception is not possible without naming, 
without language; such is the relation between the imaginary and the symbol-
ic, conscious and unconscious. 
      The self-perception of the subject is one of unsatisfied desire. When the 
subject sees itself as a unity in the other, in the imaginary, the world as given 
by the Other becomes fragmented, alienated, decomposed. When the subject 
sees the world (the Other) as a unity, in the symbolic, it is the subject which 
becomes fragmented and alienated. Such an oscillation in perception is mani-
fest in the dream. The subject is either in one place, in the imaginary, or in 
several places, in the symbolic, exceeding the limitations of perceived reali-
ty, exiting the cave, as it were. If the subject is in several places in the sym-
bolic, it is in the form of multiple ideal egos which reinforce the imaginary. 
The perceived object or the other occurs in the dream as the body of the sub-
ject itself in the ideal ego, as a reflection of the subject, a mirror image, 
which is not present. The image in the dream is thus a simulacrum, a copy of 
an original which does not exist, as in a chôra, a place which is not a place. 
The reflection of the subject also occurs in conscious perception; it is present 
in every act of perception. In perception, the subject is not aware of that 
which it perceives as its own reflection, while in the dream it becomes ap-
parent, because the ideal ego, a product of conscious experience, is not as 
present in the dream. As a result, in the dream the subject becomes aware of 
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its isolation and alienation from the world which it perceives, as it is repro-
duced in the mnemic residues of its won perception and intellection. 
      The isolation and alienation that the subject feels in relation to the world 
which it perceives is alleviated through the intervention of the symbolic, to 
which the dream leads the subject. The alienation of the subject is absolved 
in its conscious rationality, in the universality, the all-encompassing reality 
system, of language, in an illusion of consciousness and a méconnaissance. 
But it is in that conscious rationality that the subject disappears, becomes “no 
more than a pawn” (p. 168), is objectified in the signifying chain of lan-
guage, and becomes determined by language, by the Other, which is the dis-
course of the unconscious. For Lacan in The Four Fundamental Concepts of 
Psycho-Analysis, “The signifier, producing itself in the field of the Other, 
makes manifest the subject of its signification. But it functions as a signifier 
only to reduce the subject in question to being no more than a signifier, to 
petrify the subject in the same movement in which it calls the subject to 
function, to speak, as subject” (p. 207). The result is “the temporal pulsation 
in which is established that which is the characteristic of the departure of the 
unconscious as such—the closing.” Time, alteration, mathematics in discur-
sive reason, are the mechanisms of conscious thought in the repression of the 
unconscious. The unconscious is something which perpetually opens and 
closes within the mechanisms of conscious thought. It is never present as 
other than an absence, a trace, in the gap between the imaginary and the 
symbolic, in which the subject is “born divided” (p. 199). 
      The subject becomes the network of signifiers in language, which is the 
dream. The subject finds itself in the layers of images in dreams in which the 
network of signifiers is played out. The optical model of the dream, in the 
intersection of the imaginary and symbolic, consists of “a number of layers, 
permeable to something analogous to light whose refraction changes from 
layer to layer. This is the locus where the affair of the subject of the uncon-
scious is played out” (p. 45). This something analogous to light is as an inner 
light, as it were, a reflection of the perceived light of the ideal ego in the im-
aginary, in the mnemic residue of perception, the construction of which 
forms the imaginary subject in relation to the symbolic. 
      The inner light is as the inner light of Plotinus. For Plotinus, as the con-
structed model of perception interacts with that which is perceived, as ob-
jects are reconstructed in mnemic residues, perception does not depend 
entirely on an external light, but also an internal light, as a mnemic residue 
itself. In the Enneads, “there is an earlier light within itself, a more brilliant, 
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which it sees sometimes in a momentary flash.…This is sight without the act, 
but it is the truest seeing, for it sees light whereas its other objects were the 
lit not the light” (V.5.7).9 Internal perception is the truest perception because 
it is a more immediate perception of that which is constructed in perception 
in conscious thought. The internal perception, the function of the symbolic 
and the intellectual, is only engaged with sensible objects as mnemic resi-
dues, and is more closely connected the processes of intellection, the for-
mation and understanding of intelligible form, wat can be understood without 
being perceived. The intellectual of Plotinus, that which is other than discur-
sive reason in mind, or the unconscious, “must have its vision—not of some 
light in some other thing but of the light within itself, unmingled, pure, sud-
denly gleaming before it.” The pure light is the light which illuminates the 
intelligible form in the mind’s eye, the irradiation of the spiritual light as de-
scribed by Robert Grosseteste. The pure light is uncompromised by corporeal 
perception and material relations. 
      The inner light which is perceived is that which is other than given by 
reason in perception. Hegel defines the inner light as that which is shapeless 
and formless, thus that which is given by something other than sense-
certainty, perception or consciousness, that which does not correspond to the 
mnemic residues of perception. In the Phenomenology of Spirit, light as 
shapelessness is “the pure, all-embracing and all-pervading essential light of 
sunrise, which pervades itself in its formless substantiality” (686). The gene-
sis of the being-for-self of spirit, objective spirit, or reason, consists of “tor-
rents of light,” while the return into the being-in-itself of spirit from the 
moments of its existence, the manifestation in particulars, as given by per-
ception, consists of “streams of fire destructive of structured form,” that 
which is given by language. 
      Lacan described the layers of the optical model of the dream through 
which the matrix of the symbolic is filtered, in the form of the subject, and 
through which the inner light is refracted, as an “immense display, a special 
specter, situated between perception and consciousness” (The Four Funda-
mental Concepts of Psycho-Analysis, p. 45). The optical model of the dream 
is located between the mnemic residues of perception which produce the 
dream on the imaginary level, and the symbolic matrix of the Other. The 
Other is situated in the interval that separates perception and consciousness, 
in the chôra of the intersection, and it is there that the subject is constituted, 
in the layered apparition of the intersection of the imaginary and symbolic, 
which in rhetorical terms is the in-between, the locus of the trace. 
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      The separation between the functioning of perception and consciousness 
is necessary in order for the Wahrnehmungszeichen, the traces of perception, 
to become mnemic residues, to pass into memory. The traces must be effaced 
in perception, in the temporal and particular mechanisms of objective experi-
ence, and must be constituted simultaneously in the “signifying synchrony” 
(p. 46), the universal concept, or objective of Hegel. The passage from per-
ception to consciousness is the passage from the particular to the universal, 
as consciousness is given through language; consciousness begins in percep-
tion, in the particular of the mnemic residue. In the Phenomenology of Spirit 
of Hegel, perception already “takes what is present to it as a universal” 
(111); consciousness is already implicated in perception. It is the mnemic 
residue which differentiates consciousness from perception, which is the dis-
covery of Freud in the analysis of dreams, and which renders consciousness 
as alienated from the constitution of the subject. The passage from the par-
ticular to the universal, from the diachronic to the synchronic, which occurs 
for Hegel in perception itself, occurs for Freud in the passage from percep-
tion to consciousness, from the imaginary to the symbolic, in which is found 
the constitution of the subject.  
      The Wahrnehmungszeichen are immediately transformed into a signify-
ing synchrony in that they immediately become signifiers. The layers be-
tween perception and consciousness are the layers in which the traces of 
perception enter the symbolic as signifiers. The permeation through the lay-
ers thus entails a dialectical process of fragmentation and dispersal combined 
with unification and coalescence, in the two-way interaction between the im-
aginary and symbolic, between image and word. Such a dialectical interac-
tion is present in language, in metaphor. “What we have here are those 
functions of contrast and similitude so essential in the constitution of meta-
phor, which is introduced by a diachrony,” said Lacan in The Four Funda-
mental Concepts of Psycho-Analysis” (p. 46), and which incorporates both 
condensation and displacement, as in the dream work. The mechanisms of 
language reveal the same interstice between perception and consciousness in 
which the constitution of the subject is to be found. 
      The definition of the subject between perception and consciousness, as 
between the imaginary and symbolic, is one of rupture and discontinuity in 
the lacuna which is present in language, in “the gap itself that constitutes 
awakening” (p. 57). That which passes in the gap between perception and 
consciousness is as that which passes in the gaps in the glissement of the sig-
nifying chain in language, what Lacan calls the gaze, the visual equivalent of 
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the glissement between the imaginary and the symbolic. “In our relation to 
things, in so far as this relation is constituted by the way of vision, and or-
dered in the figures of representation, something slips, passes, is transmitted, 
from stage to stage, and is always to some degree eluded in it—that is what 
we call the gaze” (p. 73). The gaze is the presence of absence in perception, 
the presence of the absence of the subject in perception, as the anchoring 
point is in signification, and the point at which the subject is defined in rela-
tion to the unconscious. The relation of the subject to the Other is “entirely 
produced in a process of gap” (p. 206) in both perception and language, in 
both the imaginary and symbolic, and in particular in the intersection be-
tween them, as they are always interrelated. 
      The image in the dream, the transposition of the mnemic residue of per-
ception, is the Vorstellungsrepräsentanz described by Freud, which is not a 
representative representative (le représentant représentatif) according to La-
can (p. 60), but “that which takes place of the representation (le tenant-lieu 
de la représentation)” between perception and consciousness, the gap in 
which the subject is constituted. The Vorstellungsrepräsentanz is located in 
the “schema of the original mechanisms of alienation in that first signifying 
coupling that enable us to conceive that the subject appears first in the Other” 
(p. 218), in the signifying chain, the product of which is the elision, the 
aphanisis or disappearance of the subject. The subject is divided because as 
soon as it appears in the signifying chain, as represented by a signifier, it dis-
appears, in the same way that the mnemic residue of perception disappears 
when it is inserted into the signifying chain of the dream and is replaced by 
the Vorstellungsrepräsentanz. The Vorstellungsrepräsentanz is as the pro-
noun in language, that which replaces the absent subject in the imaginary, 
conscious thought, thus the divided subject. 
      The Vorstellungsrepräsentanz is as the binary signifier in the metaphor, 
which in the process of condensation and displacement produces significa-
tion by substituting the name of one thing for something else, and an idea is 
formed in the combination of two names. In the glissement the signified is 
transferred from one signifier to another, in what is called signifying substitu-
tion in the binary signifier. The idea, the subject, is produced in the gap be-
tween signifiers, at the point de capiton, the intersection of the imaginary and 
symbolic vectors in the L-schema, in the retroactive anticipation of presence. 
At the anchoring point, “sense emerges from non-sense” (Écrits, A Selection, 
p. 158), as Lacan described it in Écrits.  
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      The binary signifier is represented in the algorithm of the metaphoric 
process: f(S'/S)S ≈  S(+)s, where S' is the first signifier in the metaphor, S is 
the second, and the (+) represents “the crossing of the bar” (p. 164) between 
signifier and signified, given by the condensation in the binary signifier. The 
second metaphoric algorithm illustrates the importance of displacement, the 
elision of the second signified in order for the metaphor to function: S/$' · 
$'/x→S(U/s), where S is a signifier, x is the unknown signification, s is the 
signified created by the metaphor, and $', the barred S, is the elision of the 
substituted signified in the glissement. A third algorithm, S'/S x S/s → 
S'/s/S/S (The Four Fundamental Concepts of Psycho-Analysis, p. 248), 
shows the substitution of one signifier for another, and the elision of the first 
signifier, in the metaphoric process. The repressed signifier is placed in the 
Unterdrückt, the denominator under the bar, as the binary signifier. 
      As the Vorstellungsrepräsentanz is the binary signifier in the metaphoric 
process of condensation and displacement in the formation of the dream, as 
that which takes the place of the representation, it is the supersession 
(Urverdrängung) of the signifier in condensation, between the imaginary and 
symbolic, which creates the point of attraction (Anziehung), the point de cap-
iton, through which the unconscious is momentarily revealed, and which cre-
ates repression in the Unterdrückung of the signifier, which is the 
Vorstellungsrepräsentanz. It is that which occurs in the gap between the im-
aginary and the symbolic, conscious and unconscious, and between percep-
tion and consciousness, which is repressed, in the Vorstellungsrepräsentanz 
which is that which takes the place of the representation, in the glissement 
which occurs in the in-between, and the in-between which occurs in the 
glissement, in the intersection of the imaginary and symbolic as in the L 
schema. Signification occurs in the Vorstellung (Hegel’s picture-thinking), 
while the Repräsentativ occurs in the imaginary.  
      The imaginary exists in the intersubjective relation, in the ideal ego 
through which the subject identifies itself in relation to the other, based on 
the gestalt image attained in the mirror stage. The imaginary also exists in 
perception and consciousness, in the Other which constitutes the subject in 
the unconscious, in the ego and the mechanisms of thought. The ego is a 
product of the relation with the other, the necessity of intersubjectivity. The 
subject is discordant in its inability to identify itself as the image reflected by 
the other in relation to its own disappearance in language, which preserves 
the existence of the other to the subject. The ego, the mechanism of thought, 
is itself an object which appears in the world of objects. Consciousness, the 
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self-identity of the subject with its ego, is defined as a tension between the 
ego which has been alienated from the subject in its experience in language, 
and in the impossibility of its relation to the other. 
      In the perception of Plotinus, sensible forms are recognized as manifesta-
tions of ideas, and thus participate in the universal, as perception is a product 
of ego, and participates in the Other. In the intellectual, forms are self-
generating and self-supporting, as they would be mnemic residues of the im-
aginary subject to the symbolic. As forms in the intellectual are self-
generated and universal, they are not subject to the mechanisms of ego, of 
the particulars of perception or conscious reason. In the Enneads, the “facul-
ty of perception in the Soul [intellect] cannot act by the immediate grasping 
[percipi] of sensible objects, but only by the discerning of impressions print-
ed upon the Animate by sensation: these perceptions are already Intelligibles, 
while the outer sensation is a mere phantom of the other (of that in the Soul) 
which is nearer to Authentic-Existence as being an impassive reading of Ide-
al-Forms” (I.1.7). The intelligible form is the Vorstellungsrepräsentanz, that 
which takes place of the representation, which is self-generating and self-
supporting in intellect because it has entered the symbolic. The internal per-
ception of the Vorstellungsrepräsentanz is taken as the archetype of the per-
ception of sensible objects, which is only ephemeral and given by the ego in 
its imaginary identification with the other as the result of the division and al-
ienation of the subject resulting from the mirror stage. 
      If the subject for Plotinus becomes self-generating and self-supporting 
like the Vorstellungsrepräsentanz which it experiences in its intellect, then 
the subject becomes that which it perceives in the intelligible, and “when you 
perceive that you have grown to this, you are now become very vision” (En-
neads I.6.9). The subject becomes identical with a perception which is sym-
bolic, which detaches itself from the perception based on the formation of the 
imaginary ego in the mirror stage. If the intelligible perception is symbolic, 
then it is an unconscious form of perception, not determined by conscious 
reason or the insertion of the subject into language, though it is predicated on 
the intersection of the imaginary and symbolic, the mnemic residues of the 
Vorstellungsrepräsentanzen. If the subject of Plotinus detaches itself from 
the perception of objects, in both the construct of perception and the mecha-
nisms of reason which produce the perception, and perceives only the intelli-
gibles in the intellect, then the subject will “be no longer the seer, but, as that 
place has made him, the seen” (V.8.11). The subject will see itself as being 
seen by the Other; it will turn itself into an object in the symbolic, and it will 
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disappear, according to the schema of Lacan, under the conditions that the 
imaginary relation reach its own limit, and the ego fades away, dissipates, 
becomes disorganized, dissolves. 
      For Lacan the subject is always fragmented in the relation between sensi-
ble perception and language. The gap between the perception (as opposed to 
apperception) and language, between the particular and universal, between 
the signifier and the signified, between the imaginary and symbolic, is de-
fined as desire. Desire is the product of the impossibility of the imaginary in 
the symbolic, the splitting of the subject between identification with the other 
and identification in the Other, the splitting in which the unconscious is 
formed, in the repression of desire as misrecognition, méconnaissance, 
which is the only recourse of the subject. The splitting occurs in the process-
es of language, in metaphor and metonymy, as the impossible representation 
of what the subject cannot know as itself; as Lacan wrote in Écrits, “it is the 
concrete incidence of the signifier in the submission of need to demand 
which, by repressing desire into the position of the misrecognized, gives the 
unconscious its order.”10 Desire is maintained by language, as is the dehis-
cence of the subject, and the possibility of the unconscious. 
      Rather than represent the subject, language misrepresents the subject, and 
is the source of the subject’s méconnaissance, in the conflict between the im-
aginary and symbolic, conscious and unconscious thought. Language condi-
tions the relation of the subject to the Other, and blocks the relationships of 
the subject to the other. Intersubjectivity, the specificity of desire, cannot be 
articulated in language. The unconscious, as the discourse of the Other, is the 
locus of the inarticulation of desire in relation to the other in language. Ac-
cording to Lacan, “The unconscious is that part of the concrete discourse, in 
so far as it is transindividual, that is not at the disposal of the individual in re-
establishing the continuity of his conscious discourse” (Écrits, A Selection, p. 
49). As the discourse of the Other, the unconscious is that by which the sub-
ject is constituted as object, “the sum of the effects of speech on a subject, at 
that level where the subject constitutes itself from the effects of the signifi-
er,” in The Four Fundamental Concepts of Psycho-Analysis (p. 126.). The 
unconscious is the locus of the splitting of the subject, as it is inaccessible to 
the subject. The unconscious can only be grasped by the subject in mécon-
naissance, in the knowledge of its own division and impossibility. 
      Self-identity as given by consciousness or the cogito, or by the reflection 
of the subject in the other, can only be a mirage in the play of reflections in 
both the structure of the psyche and the structure of perception. When the 
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subject identifies itself in the other, or in the mirror, it is never the case of a 
subject identifying itself, but of an other identifying the subject, in the struc-
ture of the Other, as if it were identifying itself, as described by Lacan in 
Écrits (Écrits, A Selection, p. 138). The same is true in language; the subject 
misidentifies itself as the source of the signifier, while it is the signifier 
which is the cause of the subject, in the structure of the Other. Because the 
imaginary and symbolic represent themselves to the subject as unified totali-
ties, the subject, as ego, cannot perceive its own dehiscence. The unified to-
tality of the ego is reinforced by its participation in perception, and its 
participation in language, in its identification with the other. The ego is thus 
a mechanism of both sustenance and resistance. The symbolic ego ideal in 
language is constituted by opposition, negation, and denial. As a construct of 
language it is ephemeral and constantly changing; the subject as a construct 
is fleeting and vanishing. The imaginary ego is the product of a play of re-
flections in the mirage of consciousness; the subject is free to constantly re-
define itself in language, but much less free to redefine itself in perception.  
      In language the subject is caught up in the dialectical signification of the 
self and the other, the other and the other, as played out in the glissement of 
the signifying chain. As opposed to being constant and re-affirming, unlike 
the imaginary, the symbolic in language, or the Other, is constantly chang-
ing, is discontinuous and vacillating, in the double inscription (Niederschrift) 
of the conscious and unconscious, signifier and signified. Such a vacillation 
and double inscription alienates the subject from language, that by which it is 
constituted, as in the self-alienation of reason of Hegel, the infinite self-
affirmation in absolute negativity, as described in Philosophy of Mind. The 
dialectical oppositions of the subject in language, self/other, subject/object, 
conscious/unconscious, signifier/signified, imaginary/symbolic, are discon-
tinuous and vacillating as well, never constant or clearly defined. The sym-
bolic, the unconscious, is an insufficiency in relation to the identity of the 
subject, and the locus of its non-being. The subject is defined as the gap be-
tween its self-definition and its self-definition in perception, the gap between 
the symbolic and imaginary, unconscious and conscious, from which desire 
is generated in the attempt to compensate for the lack caused by language. 
The relation between the Other and the imaginary is one of discontinuity and 
conflict, so the subject can only be divided, and impossible to complete; thus 
the mechanism of desire. The lack, the incompleteness, is inscribed into the 
subject by the unconscious. 
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      The subject is always given as other to itself in language, in its relation to 
the imaginary other in consciousness. The reflection of the other “becomes 
visible with the particular configuration we call consciousness, in as much as 
the imaginary function of the ego comes into play. Man gets to see this re-
flection from the point of view of the other. He is an other for himself. This 
is what gives you the illusion that consciousness is transparent to itself. We 
aren’t present, in the reflection; to see the reflection, we are in the conscious-
ness of the other” (Seminar II, p. 112), which is manufactured by the subject. 
The identification with the other, in the dialectic of the imaginary and sym-
bolic, is a function of misrecognition, as first played out in the mirror stage. 
The dialectic of the imaginary and symbolic is a dialectic of the desire of the 
Other, the desire instituted in the subject by language, and the desire of the 
other, which is mistakenly taken to compensate for the lack caused by the 
desire of the Other.  
      For the subject in the mirror stage, “the image of his body is the principle 
of every unity he perceives in objects. Now, he only perceives the unity of 
this specific image from the outside, and in an anticipated manner” (p. 166), 
in the same way that the subject is inserted into language, in a particular sig-
nifier given by the universal of the Other, the signifying chain. “Because of 
this double relation which he has with himself, all the objects of his world 
are always structured around the wandering shadow of his own ego,” in con-
flict with the Other. “Man’s ideal unity, which is never attained as such and 
escapes him at every moment, is evoked at every moment in this perception,” 
thus the division of the subject, and the consequent desire. The object in 
which the subject seeks its unity “is never for him definitively the final ob-
ject.…it thus appears in the guise of an object from which man is irremedia-
bly separated, and which shows him the very figure of his dehiscence in the 
world,” which is an “object which by essence destroys him, anxiety, which 
he cannot recapture, in which he will never truly be able to find reconcilia-
tion, his adhesion to the world, his perfect complementarity on the level of 
desire.”  
      As a result of this, “it is in the nature of desire to be radically torn.” It is 
impossible for the subject to fulfill itself, to mediate the dialectic between the 
imaginary and symbolic. The attempted mediation, desire, is “maintained by 
a succession of momentary experiences” which constitute the subject in lan-
guage, the fleeting and vanishing subject in the signifying chain. Conscious-
ness is sustained in the subject by seeing itself be seen by the other, in the 
gaze or in the reflection, as the imaginary is subject to the symbolic, the Oth-
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er. The gaze of the other, the seeing oneself being seen, is a structuring 
mechanism of the subject in perception. Seeing oneself being seen is trans-
lated into understanding oneself being understood in language, the anticipa-
tion of the recognition of the subject by the other in the communicative 
function in language. In the same way that the subject cannot in actuality see 
itself being seen by the other, because the subject only exists as a signifier in 
the Other for the other, the subject cannot in actuality understand itself being 
understood by the other. The mirage of consciousness of the subject is sus-
tained in the illusion that what the subject says is being understood by the 
other in relation to what is said. This is never the case. Language only com-
municates by misunderstanding, méconnaissance. What the other under-
stands to be communicated is never what is intended, because language can 
only function as a resistance to the imaginary relation between the subject 
and the other, the wall of language which intersects object identification in 
the quadrature of the ego in the L schema. I can never completely know how 
other people see me or what they think of me, or if they understand me; I am 
driven y the desire to know what I cannot know. 
      The barrier between language and communication is the unconscious, the 
interposition of which in conscious discourse makes communication impos-
sible between the subject and the other, in the méconnaissance of the dialec-
tic of the imaginary and symbolic in the formation of the ego, the 
mechanisms of thought. The unconscious for Lacan only appears in trans-
individual or trans-subjective relations, in the impossibility of communica-
tion in language. Conscious discourse is a sequential structuring which, with 
the introjection of the unconscious, the Other, is subject to discontinuity and 
vacillation, which lends to the impossibility of communication. As Lacan 
says, it is not the function of language to communicate, but rather the func-
tion of language to evoke, to evoke the impossible relation of desire between 
the subject and the other as inscribed in the Other.  
      The imaginary, as opposed to the symbolic, is subjected to a sequential 
structuring, and is thus at odds with the symbolic in the attempt at communi-
cation. The mechanisms of regression, repression, omission, ellipsis, pleo-
nasm, catachresis, etc., are as fundamental in the structuring of language as 
are grammar and syntax, and represent the problematic function of language 
as that which communicates. Metaphor and metonymy combine both sequen-
tial structuring and repression and over-determination, displacement and 
condensation; they thus combine the mechanisms which make language pos-
sible with the mechanisms which make language impossible. Repression in 
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language, the Unterdrückung in metaphor and metonymy, is the repression 
of the subject, and maintains the illusion of consciousness in language, while 
at the same time preventing the subject from knowing its own unconscious, 
and thus preventing the subject from being able to communicate to the other, 
which it can only identify in the structure of the Other, to which it does not 
have access. The repression in language is a repression of the ideal ego 
formed in the mirror stage, which nevertheless continues to be present, and 
through which the subject seeks itself in the other, in a function of desire, 
which cannot be consummated, because of the inaccessibility of the Other in 
which the desire is formed. 
      The intercession of the imaginary ego in the maintenance of the symbolic 
in language represses the non-being of the subject to itself and prevents the 
metaphoric death of the subject to itself. It is impossible to separate the im-
aginary ego, the recognition of the subject in the other, from the symbolic, 
the objectivity of the Other. The identification of the imaginary and symbol-
ic, the mirage of identity in reflection, the illusion of continuity in con-
sciousness in language and perception, is the locus of méconnaissance. 
Language is that which distorts experience. In the identity given by reflec-
tion, and the objectification of the subject in language, the self-identity of the 
subject is a sustained fiction, a myth. Language, according to Lacan, is a my-
thology, as the Other, that which cannot be known and is yet the allegory of 
human identity. The identity of the subject is always in a state of flux, and is 
always inaccessible. 
      The individual speech act in language, parole, is that which interjects the 
Other, the unconscious, into discourse, and which disrupts the imaginary re-
lation. Parole is that which enacts the impossible desire on the part of the 
subject in the attempted identification with the other; it is that which makes 
communication in language impossible, which enacts the impossible relation 
between the subject and the other, in the presence of the imaginary which in-
troduces discontinuity in the symbolic. Parole is the catachresis, pleonasm or 
ellipsis inserted into the signifying chain which announces the presence of 
the Other and the possibility of the unconscious in the disruption of the signi-
fying sequence. Parole is also that which enacts the point de capiton in the 
retroactive sliding of the signifier in the anticipation of the subject, the inter-
referentiality of the signifier in relation to other signifiers. Parole is set in 
opposition to la langue, which is the underlying structure of language seen as 
separate from individual speech acts, which is the structure of the Other, 
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which is the unconscious, which appears in the signifying chain at the point 
de capiton.  
      In Seminar XX (On Feminine Sexuality: The Limits of Love and 
Knowledge), la langue is suggested by “llanguage,” which is defined as that 
which in language exceeds conscious discourse and parole, but which incor-
porates them, according to Lacan. “Llanguage serves purposes that are alto-
gether different from that of communication” (p. 138),11 different from the 
functions of dialogue as a mechanism in the relation between the subject and 
the other. “If I have said that language is what the unconscious is structured 
like, that is because language, first of all, doesn’t exist,” because the uncon-
scious does not exist. “Language is what we try to know concerning the 
function of llanguage” as psychoanalysis is what we try to know concerning 
the function of the unconscious. Scientific discourse is a language which ap-
proaches language but does not actualize language, because it misrecognizes 
the unconscious. “The unconscious evinces knowledge that, for the most 
part, escapes the speaking being” (p. 139) in language. What is articulated in 
the subject is beyond the knowledge of the subject in language, and is that 
which is given by llanguage, and is that which is articulated of llanguage in 
language by the unconscious.  
      The effects of llanguage are not something that the speaking subject is 
able to enunciate, as in parole. The linguistic structure of the unconscious is 
only a hypothetical structure, conceived to support the existence of llan-
guage, that which is other than that which can be enunciated, or that which 
can be known through language. Llanguage is thus an effect of the real. 
Llanguage reveals that language is other than communication. Language, as 
a complex of signifiers which represent the subject, is a function of llan-
guage in revealing the unconscious of the subject. Llanguage is the language 
of the unconscious, which is unknowable and inaccessible, but which reveals 
itself as absence in language, in the communicative shortcomings of lan-
guage in the imaginary and conscious discourse, language and perception. 
      The speaking subject is an instrument of language as a function of llan-
guage, a function of the unconscious, in the discourse of the Other. As a re-
sult, “the subject turns out to be—and this is only true for speaking beings—
a being whose being is always elsewhere, as the predicate shows” (p. 142), 
that is, “speaking.” “The subject is never more than fleeting and vanishing, 
for it is a subject only by a signifier and to another signifier.” Llanguage is 
the space of the structure of language outside of language itself, like the 
“gasping chasm in the sky” in the Myth of Er in the Republic (614) of Plato, 
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where there was revealed to the immortal souls “a shaft of light stretching 
from above straight through earth and heaven.…this light is the bond of 
heaven and holds its whole circumference together, like the swifter of a tri-
reme” (616). Llanguage is as the mythological unseen superstructure of the 
universe of language, that which exceeds that which cannot be exceeded in 
knowledge, given the limitation of knowledge. 
      Language itself is only a continuous misconstruction, as language is that 
which defines the subject in relation to the Other, which is the unconscious. 
The subject is an effect of language, an effect of misconstruction. The mis-
construction of language is the illusion of consciousness, the self-identity of 
the subject in reason, and the limitations of knowledge, which are the sub-
jects of metaphysics. Conscious discourse, as perpetuated by the imaginary 
ego, screens the subject from the unconscious; the unconscious cannot be re-
vealed in conscious discourse, except as an interruption, or disturbance, or 
absence, thus “the less we articulate it, the less we talk, and the more it 
speaks us,”12 according to Lacan in Seminar III (The Psychoses). Access to 
the unconscious is a kind of docta ignorantia, learned ignorance. In the De 
docta ignorantia of Nicolas Cusanus in the fifteenth century, visible things 
are seen as enigmas and images of divine creation, that which is hidden and 
incomprehensible (p. 22),13 as the subject of Lacan is an enigma of the un-
conscious, that which is hidden and incomprehensible. According to Cusan-
us, everything is visible as a continual instability in the material world, as the 
subject of Lacan is given by language. 
      For Lacan, every word in language, every signifier, contains the dialectic 
of the symbolic and the imaginary, the Other and the other. The subject is 
always present and always not present in the fluctuation of language caused 
by the interjection of the unconscious, and each word contains the trace of 
the previous signifier and the trace of an absence, as in the différance of Der-
rida. The splitting of the subject occurs in every word that is spoken, in the 
very act of speaking. Language itself is a metaphor for lack of being, the ab-
sence which it replaces as supplement (Derrida’s term), and it is also a me-
tonymy in the production of nonsense in relation to the subject as constituted 
by the unconscious. The mechanisms of language, condensation and dis-
placement, as revealed in dream analysis, are the mechanisms of the desire of 
the Other, in both the imaginary and symbolic. 
      In metaphor and metonymy, according to Lacan, “the subject has to find 
the constituting structure of his desire in the same gap opened up by the ef-
fect of the signifiers in those who come to represent the Other for him, in so 
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far as his demand is subjected to them” (Écrits, A Selection, p. 264). The im-
aginary ego of the subject identifies itself in the other through the mecha-
nisms of the symbolic, the Other, in the gap created by the signifiers in the 
discourse which is presented to it. The subject recognizes the same effect of 
desire in the dream, also a desire of the Other, as the dream reveals the dis-
course of the Other. “Perhaps one can catch a glimpse in passing of the rea-
son for his effect of occultation that caught our attention in the recognition of 
the desire of the dream. The desire of the dream is not assumed by the sub-
ject who says ‘I’ in his speech,” the ego ideal of the symbolic. “Articulated, 
nevertheless, in the locus of the Other, it is discourse.…Thus the wishes that 
it constitutes have no optative inflection to alter the indicative of their formu-
la.” The effects of desire on the subject in the dream are given by the linguis-
tic structure of the dream, and not the Vorstellungsrepräsentanz that occurs 
in the dream as the product of imaginary ego identification. 
      The effects of desire are instituted by metaphor and metonymy, in con-
densation and displacement, in the subject as soon as the subject enters into 
language during the mirror stage. Language provides substitutions for object 
identifications, as in the Fort! Da! game described by Freud. In the newly 
constituted symbolic order, language forms a link in the subject to pre-
linguistic experiences and perceptions, and compensates for the alienation 
and absence experienced by the subject created by the “wall of language” it-
self, as both the gestalt image of the mirror stage and the word intervene in 
the direct experience of the perceiving subject. The metaphoric constitution 
of the subject in its early formation in language returns to the subject in con-
scious discourse through metaphor and metonymy as that which is repressed 
in the Other, the unconscious. These signifying chains occur as secondary 
repressions referring to the repressed signifying chains in the unconscious, 
the Urverdrängung, as in condensation in the dream. The point of the repres-
sion of the signifier is the point de capiton, the point at which the repressed 
is revealed, as the unconscious in conscious discourse, as in the formation of 
the Vorstellungsrepräsentanz. The repressed signifiers are translatable in re-
lation to conscious signifiers. 
      This is represented by Lacan in the algorithm for the metaphor which 
reads S/S1' ∙  S2'/x  →   (I/S'') (Écrits, 1966, p. 890). S1' is the combination 
of the signifier and the Vorstellungsrepräsentanz, the unconscious represen-
tation that takes the place of the mnemic residue of the conscious perception, 
the intelligible form that takes the place of the sensible form, that constitutes 
language (S). S2' is the condensation which occurs in the Vorstellungs-
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repräsentanz which is absorbed into the signifying chain in language. The 
linguistic metaphor S refers to the imaginary ego or ideal ego (x) by which 
the Vorstellungsrepräsentanz is transferred to identification with the other by 
the subject. The imaginary identification is supported by inaccessible signi-
fying chains (S'') which correspond to the signifying chains in language 
(I/S''). The signifying chains revealed in the structure of the dream corre-
spond to the signifying chains in conscious discourse, and carry with them 
the same relation between the imaginary and the symbolic. A relation is es-
tablished between conscious discourse and the repressed discourse of the un-
conscious as revealed in the dream, and thus the psychoanalyst is able to see 
how the repressed discourse of the unconscious plays a role in the language 
of the subject, through the interaction of the imaginary and symbolic in the 
formation of the subject in the mirror stage. 
      Given this correlation, unconscious language, or the discourse of the 
Other in the unconscious, cannot be seen to operate according to the same 
rules or logic of conscious language, notwithstanding the occurrences of lin-
guistic structures which can be observed in dream work. The dream is not the 
unconscious, but rather conscious mechanisms in the production of the Vor-
stellungsrepräsentanzen which are seen to lead to the unconscious, as the or-
ganization of mnemic residues in dreams is not the product of conscious 
thought, though the perception of them is, and any signification which might 
occur in the organization can be read retroactively in the memory of the 
dream, as it is read retroactively in the signifying chain in conscious dis-
course. If language is a metaphor, then the dream is a metaphor, for the same 
supplement to the lack of being created by the Vorstellungsrepräsentanz that 
is created by the imaginary object identification in the conscious subject. As 
a metaphor, the dream also contains repressed content, as represented in the 
algorithm S…S'/∆…$, where the S…S' is the signifying chain of the dream, 
the manifest content, the dream image, and the ∆…$ is the latent content of 
the dream, the dream thought, the elided subject which is not accessible to 
conscious discourse, but which is present in the dream in the imaginary iden-
tifications of the Vorstellungsrepräsentanzen, as they are present in con-
scious discourse in the elided subject of identifications with the other, within 
the context of the Other. Just as in conscious discourse, the metaphoric signi-
fication of the dream contains gaps, lacunae, scotomata, which disrupt the 
language of the dream and reveal the mechanisms of the unconscious, not to 
mention the condensations and displacements themselves, and the ellipses, 
pleonasms, syllepses and catachreses. 
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      The dream reveals the llanguage that is not accessible to conscious rea-
son, the mechanisms of reason which are outside of reason itself, as in the 
chasm in the sky in the Myth of Er in the Republic of Plato, which reveals 
the structure of the world outside the world, like the swifter on a trireme. But 
the dream also gives a hint of the mechanisms of llanguage, as they are fil-
tered into conscious reason, in parole. The effect which is defined as that 
which connects the mechanisms of llanguage with the mechanisms of parole 
is desire. Desire is the effect of the elision of the subject in the metaphoric 
chain and the necessity of the subject to assume an alienating identity in lan-
guage; desire is desire of the Other. It is the effect of the mirror stage, that 
which causes the infant to substitute for the object identifications, to com-
pensate for the internal division caused by the object identification in the im-
aginary ego, and to compensate for the alienation that goes along with the 
formation of the symbolic, the Other. Desire is the use of language in the im-
possibility of returning to the mythical state of unity between imaginary and 
symbolic; it is the mechanism of the formation of metaphor and metonymy 
in tropic language in the production of a subject which does not exist.  
      The product of desire is the vacillating, inconsistent slope of the signify-
ing chain in speech, the disruptive parole of imaginary identification, and the 
lacunae and scotomata produced by the intercession of the unconscious, the 
desire of the Other. Desire is contained in metaphor and metonymy, in con-
densation and displacement, as the link between the speaking subject and its 
identity, which is inaccessible to it. It is manifest in the pulsations of con-
scious reason, the modulations and transformations of alteration and opposi-
tion brought about by perception, as in the “alteration of light and dark” (p. 
167),14 as described by Lacan in Seminar III (The Psychoses), which is, ac-
cording to Plato, the basis of all mathematics. Desire is present in every 
word, as a companion to the absence which is present in every word, as trace 
of the subject which has been elided from its own reason, and which seeks its 
identity in that reason. It is the desperation and impossibility of the human 
condition, and that which pushes reason, and language, to exceed them-
selves, to allow the subject to be freed from them, to travel outside of them, 
like the immortal souls in the Myth of Er. The instrument of desire is the sig-
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This essay developed and rewritten from sections of Architecture and Psychoanaly-
sis, New York: Peter Lang, 2006, without the references to architecture, and with 
revisions and corrections. 
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